Parachinar is Hell-Remembering Sadda

The Sad Tragedy Of Sadda Incident

Hamid Hussain

A Food supply convoy was attacked near sadda on Thursday 19th june 2008 this convoy also consisted of nineteen passengers. These nineteen passengers were kidnapped along with the thirteen trucks of food and medicine. After looting the convoy these thirteen trucks along with their four drivers were burnt to ashes.The rest of the eight drivers were taken prisoners and keeping them hostage for five days they were brutally murdered by first dismembering, disfiguring and then slaughtering them.

This brutal incident happened in the supervision of LT.COL Majeed and Atta-ur-rehman Assistant Political Agent (APA)Lower Kurram Agency Pakistan,infact the kidnapped persons were handed over to the terrorist by the security forces after the deliberation between LT.COL Majeed and Atta-ur-rehman (APA)with the local Taliban’s .The government kept the Turi Tribe in dark that the hostages will be released soon; This gruesome act happened when the security forces took over the control of hill tops of sangeena and balish khail villages, hence giving security coverage to the Taliban. This clearly indicates the what so ever happened, was with the connivance of security forces.

The kurram agency is besieged and remained cutoff for the last eight months from the rest of the country resulting in shortage of food ,medicine and closure of educational institutions in the area .The local population of kurram agency has appealed to the united nations (UN) to intervene and protested on this incident and closure of the roads.

POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE

POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE

by Samuel Helfont

 

Samuel Helfont is the author of Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Islam and
Modernity. He  is a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellow
in  Princeton   University's  Department   of  Near  Eastern
Studies, where  he is  pursuing a  Ph.D.  He is also an Iraq
war veteran  and  continues  to  serve  as  an  intelligence
officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve.

        POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE

                    by Samuel Helfont

Wahhabism and  the Muslim Brotherhood are two distinct forms
of Sunni Islamism. They have separate histories and separate
worldviews. In  reality they  are not  even the same type of
movement.  Their   origins  were  largely  unrelated.  Their
historic missions  have been  completely different,  as  are
their current  goals and  means of  achieving  those  goals.
Unfortunately, these  differences too often are overshadowed
by a false Sunni-Shia dichotomy that tends to lump all Sunni
Islamists together.  But learning  the  differences  between
Sunni Islamists  is critical  to understanding  politics and
terrorism in the Arab Middle East. One could even argue that
the most  important division  shaping Arab  politics is  not
between Sunnis  and Shias  but between  the Wahhabis and the
Brotherhood. Before delving into current issues, however, it
is first  necessary to  define differences between Wahhabism
and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Wahhabism stems  from the  theological teachings of Muhammad
ibn abd  al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century reformer. Abd al-
Wahhab was  one of  several "revivalist"  thinkers to emerge
from that  century. The  mission of these revivalists was to
purify and thereby revitalize Islam. They carried the banner
of reform  but  unlike  modern  reformers,  they  wanted  to
transform Islam  on traditionally  Islamic grounds. They did
not attempt  to  adapt  it  to  other  systems  of  thought,
politics,  or   culture.  Their   goals  did   not   include
modernizing Islam  to meet  the demands of a changing world.
In this  sense they  were pre-modern.  Wahhabism is thus, at
its heart,  a pre-modern theological movement and Wahhabists
continue to  make mostly  theological  arguments  about  the
oneness of God and proper forms of worship. Their historical
mission has  been a  call to  reform Islam  according  to  a
strict and  narrowly defined theology. There are, of course,
political implications  to this  understanding of Islam, but
Wahhabism is  still best  understood as a theological reform
movement.

The Muslim  Brotherhood, on  the other  hand, is a political
organization  originating  in  Egypt's  cosmopolitan  cities
during the  twentieth century. The Brotherhood's Islamism is
one of  several political  ideologies to emerge out of Egypt
in the  late nineteenth  and early  twentieth century.  Like
Pan-Arabism, nationalism,  and socialism, which also emerged
in Egypt  at that time, the Brotherhood's Islamism is at its
heart a  political identity.  The historical  mission of the
Brotherhood has  been political  reform based  on an Islamic
political identity.  Just as nationalists promoted an ethno-
national identity,  and socialists  promoted  a  class-based
identity, the  Brotherhood  promoted  a  political  identity
based  on   Islam.  Unlike   the  Wahhabists,  however,  the
Brotherhood was not concerned with implementing a particular
theology.   It    recruited   members   who   held   various
understandings of  Sunni Islam  and its leaders were laymen,
not Islamic  scholars. The Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-
Banna was a school teacher, as was the important brotherhood
theorist, Sayid Qutb. Al-Banna's successor Hassan al-Hudaybi
was a  lawyer. Thus,  the reforms  that the  Brotherhood has
called  for   have  almost   always  been   political,   not
theological. In  fact, they  often mixed  traditional  Islam
with modern  political thought. For example, the Brotherhood
has    embraced    nationalism,    constitutionalism,    and
participation in  elections. Its  rhetoric was-and continues
to be-full  of anti-Imperialist  arguments that  are  common
throughout the  third world. These were not strictly Islamic
concepts.

It should  be clear,  then, that  Wahhabism and  the  Muslim
Brotherhood are  two distinct  movements. Indeed  the Muslim
Brothers and  the Wahhabists  have often been fierce critics
of one another. They each consider the other to have divided
the  Islamic   community.     Wahhabists  blame  the  Muslim
Brotherhood for  what  it  calls  hizbiyyah  (partisanship).
They  claim   that  because  the  Brotherhood  supports  the
formation of  political parties,  it has  divided the Muslim
world  into   competing  factions.     Further,   Wahhabists
criticize the Brotherhood's theological leniency, as well as
its modern  political influences.  As one Wahhabist recently
put it,  the Muslim  Brothers "have  consistently overlooked
the principal  aspect of  calling their  followers to tawhid
(the oneness  of God)  and forbidding  them from polytheism,
because these  are matters  which require time and effort to
change, matters  which people  do not  find easy  to accept.
[The Muslim  Brothers] were  more  concerned  with  amassing
groups of  people together rather than calling the people to
the way  of the  Prophet."[1] The  Brotherhood, on the other
hand, has accused the Wahhabists of being so strict in their
interpretations  of  Islam  that  they  have  caused  fitnah
(schism). They  argue that  this fitnah  pits one  group  of
Muslims against another and that Islam strictly forbids such
divisions.

REGIONAL POLITICS
Unfortunately, the  differences  and  indeed  the  conflicts
between the Brotherhood and the Wahhabists have not received
the attention  they deserve.   In  the aftermath of the U.S.
invasion of  Iraq in  2003,  a  bloody  conflict  broke  out
between Iraq's  Sunnis and Shias. This conflict has led some
to see  the entire  region through  the prism of the age-old
Sunni-Shia  struggle.   While  this  conflict  is  certainly
important, dividing the Middle East along sectarian lines is
not an  accurate way  to assess the loyalties-or predict the
actions of-various regional actors.

For example,  when Israel  went to  war  with  Hezbollah  in
Lebanon in  the summer of 2006 and with Hamas in Gaza in the
winter  of  2008-2009,  the  region  did  not  divide  along
sectarian lines.  In both of these conflicts, the Shias from
Hezbollah and  Iran aligned  with Sunni Islamists from Hamas
and other  Muslim Brotherhood  associated organizations.  On
the other  side of  the  regional  divide  were  Sunni  Arab
Nationalists,  traditional   Sunni  monarchies,   and  Sunni
Islamists with  Wahhabist tendencies.  These  groupings  are
generally indicative  of the  political order  in the Middle
East. Indeed,  on other  contentious issues that are said to
divide Sunnis  and Shias,  the divisions  that were apparent
during the  recent Israeli  wars with  Hezbollah  and  Hamas
continue to  be dominant.  For  example,  the  Sunni  Muslim
Brotherhood  has   often  defended  Iran's  nuclear  program
ignoring the  interests of  its fellow  Sunnis. So  while  a
divide does  exist in  regional politics,  it is not between
Sunnis and Shias.

One reason  for the Brotherhood's alliance with the Shias is
that the  Brotherhood is a political movement concerned with
bringing  Muslims   together  under   an  Islamic  political
identity. It  is open to differing interpretations of Islam,
and is, therefore, less critical of the Shias. Additionally,
Ruhollah Khomeini's political Islam in Iran was very similar
to the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. Both called for taqrib
(the  bringing   together   of   sects),   both   downplayed
traditional theology,  and both  have similar understandings
of an  Islamic state.  Iran, for example, has a constitution
and  holds   elections.  The   regime,   therefore,   claims
legitimacy based  on a mix of Islamic and modern principles.
If the  Muslim Brotherhood were to form an Islamic state, it
would probably  look similar  to the  current Iranian state.
This is  despite the  fact that  one group  is Sunni and the
other is  Shia. The Wahhabists, on the other hand, care more
about theology  than  politics.  They,  therefore,  denounce
democracy  as  un-Islamic  and  often  forbid  Muslims  from
participating in  elections. They deplore what they consider
deviant sects  such as Shiism, and even when their interests
align  such  as  in  Hezbollah's  war  against  Israel,  the
Wahhabists refuse to support Shias.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabists compete for power
and influence  in  most  Arab  states.  Because  the  Middle
Eastern political  order is currently defined by Iran's push
for hegemony,  the competition  between the  Brotherhood and
the Wahhabists  has a  profound affect on regional politics.
Any  gain   the  Brotherhood  makes  in  comparison  to  the
Wahhabists pushes  the Arab  states closer to Iran. Any gain
the Wahhabists  make pushes  the Arab states away from Iran.
This battle  is currently  taking place  throughout the Arab
Middle East,  yet because most researchers and analysts lump
all Sunni Islamists together, it has been mostly overlooked.
Policymakers, therefore, should understand that (1) the most
important division  in the Middle East is not between Sunnis
and Shias, but the internal divisions within Sunni Islamism,
and (2)  the success  or failure  of Sunni  Islamism,  as  a
whole, is  not as important to the regional balance of power
as who among the Sunni Islamists are successful.

JIHAD AND TERRORISM
The deep  divisions between  Sunni Islamists  are  not  only
important to  the regional  balance  of  power.  The  United
States, for  example, in  trying to  combat terrorism,  must
understand the  difference between Wahhabists and the Muslim
Brotherhood. Both  streams of  Sunni Islamism claim to carry
out jihad  in the name of Islam, so researchers and analysts
often mistakenly  lump them together. In reality, the Muslim
Brotherhood's  jihad   is  not  the  same  as  that  of  the
Wahhabists. These  two separate  understandings of jihad may
share several  important similarities,  but they  also  have
significant   differences    and    are    sometimes    even
contradictory.  Understanding  how  each  group  comprehends
jihad is,  therefore, paramount  for policymakers  concerned
with terrorism.  Failing to  distinguish between  these  two
groups  could   result  in  wasting  valuable  resources  on
preparing for  an attack  that will  never come,  or  worse,
being unprepared in the face of imminent danger.

In the  modern world,  the concept of jihad can been seen as
both useful  and problematic  for Muslims.   It is useful in
offering a powerful and religiously sanctioned call to arms.
Many  modern   Muslims,  from  both  secular  and  religious
movements, have  called for  jihad as  a means  of  rallying
support for  war. However, for modern Muslims engaged in the
battle of ideas, the legacy of jihad can be problematic.  At
present, there is a widely accepted stigma against offensive
and expansionist  warfare. This  is particularly true in the
Muslim world  which was  conquered and ruled by expansionist
European empires  in the  nineteenth and  twentieth century.
Therefore,  many  Muslims,  attempting  to  fuse  Islam  and
modernity, have  trouble coming to terms with the historical
practice of  expansionist jihad.  Consider, for example, the
sermons of  the prominent Muslim Brotherhood related scholar
Yusuf al-Qaradawi.  In one  sermon, al-Qaradawi insists that
the "Prophet  Muhammad did  not carry  a sword, but used the
good word  to preach  his message."[2]  Nevertheless,  in  a
sermon less  than a  year earlier,  he had  claimed that the
Prophet Muhammad's  life "was  one of continuous jihad.  The
ten years  he spent in Medina were bloody jihad and fighting
against non-belief, infidelity, Judaism, and others."[3]

Because of  this  friction  between  pre-modern  and  modern
norms, the  Muslim Brotherhood has reinterpreted the meaning
of jihad,  infusing it  with modern  concepts. It  generally
understands jihad  as resistance to expansionist warfare and
imperialism.  It   does  not   consider  domestic  political
violence to  be jihad  and  it  condemns  attacks  on  other
Muslims. The only time the Brotherhood considers jihad to be
legitimate is  when it  takes place  on Muslim  land that it
deems occupied  by a  non-Muslim force.  Today,  this  would
include Israel,  Iraq, Afghanistan,  Chechnya,  Kashmir  and
other similar  locales. Once jihad is declared, however, the
Brotherhood uses whatever means it has at its disposal. This
includes suicide  bombings, targeting civilians, and the use
of women and children.

Wahhabists, by  comparison, care  less about modern stigmas.
While they  may employ  modern norms in their rhetoric, they
refuse  to   have  their   actions  constrained   by  modern
discourse.   For this  reason,  the  concept  of  jihad  has
evolved differently within Wahhabism.

Wahhabists generally  see the Brotherhood's reinterpretation
of jihad  as an  abomination. Muhammad  ibn abd  al-Wahhab's
interpretation of  jihad makes no apology for aggression. In
fact  offensive  jihad  was  essential  for  the  spread  of
Wahhabism in  the eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century.  The
famous union between abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud was
based on  the idea  that Saud  would have  much to gain from
religiously-sanctioned expansive warfare.

Modern Wahhabists  attempt to  stay true  to the  pre-modern
teachings of  abd al-Wahhab.  They do  not  consider  modern
norms and  stigmas to  be of any significance. In fact, they
view the  permeation of  these norms  into Islam  as a grave
threat to  the religion.  Therefore,  even  completely  non-
political  and  non-violent  Wahhabist  recognize  that  the
principle of  offensive jihad is valid, although they do not
currently practice  it. They  are extremely  critical of the
Muslim Brotherhood  related scholars  who have  argued  that
offensive jihad is invalid in the modern period. As one non-
violent Wahhabist  argues, these  Brotherhood scholars  have
"belittled"  the   Islamic  tradition   "in  the   name   of
'understanding of priorities'" and they have "declared their
loyalty for  the Infidels  in the  name of  'creating a good
picture of  Islam.'"[4] This  particular Wahhabist considers
the more  recent attempts  to reinterpret jihad unsurprising
since  historically,   the  "figureheads   of  the  Bankrupt
Brotherhood" have  been known  to "distort,  twist and water
down the objectives of Jihad."[5]

Another important  aspect of  Wahhabists' interpretations of
jihad is  their very  limited definition of who is a Muslim.
This is  based on their strict theological interpretation of
Islam. Abd  al-Wahhab had declared the overwhelming majority
of  eighteenth   century  Muslims   to  be  unbelievers  and
authorized jihad to be waged against them. Abd al-Wahhab and
his followers  were especially  confrontational toward  non-
Sunni Muslims including the Shias. This type of thinking was
reinforced in  the modern  period when  it was combined with
Sayid Qutb's  ideas. Qutb  of course,  was a Muslim Brother,
but  his   followers  formed   radical  offshoots   of   the
Brotherhood that  often combined  with  the  Wahhabists  and
ultimately  turned   against  the   Brotherhood's   original
ideology.   Unlike abd  al-Wahhab, there is no evidence that
Qutb  himself  was  anti-Shia.  His  theory  of  jahaliyyah,
however, opened the door for excommunicating Muslims who did
not conform  to his understanding of Islam. When Qutbism and
Wahhabism were merged in the 1970s and 1980s, the result was
a small  but extremely  violent strain of Wahhabist Islamism
that produced groups such as al-Qaeda.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Understanding the  divisions within Sunni Islamism will help
analysts both  avoid simple  mistakes and  put  events  into
their proper  contexts. For  example, one  should not expect
the Muslim Brotherhood to be anti-Hezbollah or anti-Iran and
vice  versus.   Conversely,  one   should  also  not  expect
Wahhabists and  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  to  work  together
simply because they are both Sunni Islamists. When trying to
understand terrorist  threats, analysts  should realize that
the Muslim  Brotherhood and  the Wahhabists  have  different
ideas of  what constitutes legitimate jihad. Analysts should
not expect  the Brotherhood  to carry  out  Al  Qaida  style
attacks on  the U.S. homeland or against other Muslims. Yet,
Muslim Brotherhood  critiques  of  this  type  of  terrorism
should not  be taken  to indicate  that the  Brotherhood has
renounced violent  jihad. To  misunderstand  this  would  be
extremely dangerous  because in  several cases,  such as  in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Muslim Brotherhood's understanding
of jihad  represents a  direct military threat to the United
States and our allies.

By viewing  the Muslim  Brotherhood  and  Wahhabism  as  two
separate movements, U.S. policymakers can address each group
separately, forming distinct policies for each.

Wahhabism presents  a unique challenge for U.S. policymakers
in that  Wahhabists consider  any  epistemology  not  rooted
entirely in  traditional  Islamic  sources  to  be  invalid.
Therefore, it  would be very difficult for the United States
to engage  Wahhabists in direct public diplomacy or a battle
of ideas.  After all,  they do not accept the modern secular
premises-whether liberal,  realists, Marxist,  etc.  -  that
Western arguments rest upon. However, the United States does
have a direct interest in limiting the influence of the more
violent Wahhabists, and in empowering the most non-political
scholars.

The first  step  is  for  U.S.  diplomats  and  policymakers
concerned with  the Middle  East to  familiarize  themselves
with  the  internal  arguments  and  language  of  Wahhabist
debates. All  Wahhabists, from  the most violent to the most
passive, share  the same  basic beliefs.  What separates  Al
Qaeda from  Wahhabists who  oppose  attacks  on  the  United
States, such  as the  Saudi religious establishment, is that
some Wahhabists  consider the  United States to have entered
into a  treaty or  an alliance  with an  Islamic ruler.  The
United States is, therefore, protected under Islamic law and
an illegitimate  target for  jihad. These are technicalities
of Islamic law but they are very important to Wahhabists and
can make the difference in convincing a Muslim to support or
refrain from  supporting terrorism.  Groups such as Al Qaeda
understand this and use it in their propaganda. For example,
when addressing  its critics  in the  wake of 9/11, Al Qaeda
made sure  to assert that "Truly, America is not, nor has it
ever  been,   a  land   of  treaty   or  alliance."[6]  U.S.
policymakers  and   practitioners  should  understand  these
debates and  in this  example, make  sure  that  the  United
States is  portrayed as  having entered into a treaty with a
legitimate  Islamic   ruler.  This   can  be  done  both  by
pressuring  Middle   Eastern  governments  to  depict  their
relationship with  the United  States in  this  manner,  and
through public  diplomacy which  does the  same. Of  course,
this type  of public diplomacy will not, on its own, end the
threat of  Al Qaeda and other violent Wahhabists, but it can
make it  much easier for nonviolent Wahhabists to discourage
others from attacking American targets.

Conversely,   the   Muslim   Brotherhood,   while   not   an
organization that  U.S. policymakers  should support  in its
current form,  is open to modernity and modernist arguments.
The Brotherhood  has made clear that, at least in theory, it
accepts the  validity of  modern norms  such as nonviolence,
non-aggression,     human     rights,     democracy,     and
constitutionalism.  Policymakers   concerned   with   public
diplomacy should,  therefore, identify  where they  feel the
Brotherhood is  not living  up to  these norms. For example,
when the  Brotherhood claims  to be nonviolent, it should be
challenged over  its support  for violence  in Israel, Iraq,
Chechnya, and Kashmir. When the Brotherhood claims to accept
human rights,  it should  be  shown  where  it  falls  short
concerning religious minorities and women's rights. When the
Brotherhood claims  to be  democratic, it  should underscore
where  its   proposed  policies   fail  to  meet  democratic
standards.  Thus  far,  the  United  States  has  failed  to
articulate these types of arguments well. It has, therefore,
let the Brotherhood's propaganda stand unchallenged; causing
many in the Islamic world to conclude that the United States
opposes the  Brotherhood not  because it  is an undemocratic
and often  militant organization, but because it is Islamic.
Policymakers should make clear that they intend to treat the
Muslim Brotherhood  as they would any other political party,
regardless of  religion. The  more the debate focuses on the
Muslim Brotherhood's politics and the less it focuses on its
religion, the  more successful  U.S. policy will be. Through
engaging the  Brotherhood indirectly in the battle of ideas,
the United  States can  challenge the Brotherhood to live up
to the principles that it already claims to accept.

By  refusing   to  favor   either  the  Brotherhood  or  the
Wahhabists,, U.S.   policymakers  might neutralize  the most
radical elements  of each  movement. This impartial approach
might also  avoid  destabilizing  the  regional  balance  of
power. The  United States could then form policies that pull
the Muslim  Brotherhood away  from militancy without pushing
it toward Wahhabism. Concurrently, it could attempt to limit
the extremes  of Wahhabism without pushing this group toward
the Iranian-led  anti-Western camp. The United States would,
therefore, be  able to  pursue its  interests  in  long-term
liberalization/democratization while  continuing to  support
short-term stability.

----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Haneef James Oliver, "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun" The Wahhabi
Myth.
http://www.thewahhabimyth.com/ikhwan.htm

[2] "Near/Middle  East: Round-Up  of Friday  Sermons 22  Sep
06," BBC Monitoring, September 26, 2006.

[3]   Qatar TV, "Live Sermon from Umar Bin-al-Khattab Mosque
in Doha,"  (November 25,  2005), BBC Monitoring: Near/Middle
East: Round-Up  of Friday  Sermons 25  Nov 05, (November 29,
2005).

[4] "Readings  in Qaradawism:  Part  4,  Discontinuation  of
Jihaad." Salafi Publications,
http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=NDV16&articleID=NDV160

004&articlePages=1

[5] Ibid.

[6] "Translation  of  April  24,  2002  al-Qaeda  document,"
Middle East Policy Council,
www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_alqaeda.asp

What USA Seeks to Destroy and How Muslims will React-This article was written in response to an e mail from a very senior US policy maker addressed to

This article was written in response to an e mail from a very senior US policy maker addressed to me in May 2002.

Basically it was a re-phrasing of what I told him how Muslims will react in response to US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although I am a leftist and free thinker this is how I thought Muslim extremists would react.

Over passage of years I believe in it more and more.

Freud was right as I read many years earlier his " Future of an Illusion " in 1985.


Article I wrote for Daily Nation Lahore 21 June 2002.The Nation published it again in AUGUST 2002 .Also published on www.orbat.com the article drew some very outraged responses from US readers:---









WHAT USA SEEKS TO DESTROY

A.H Amin

The three cardinal attributes of today's geopolitics are
"globalisation", "non ideological international themes" and "emphasis on
economics" rather than "ideological conflict" as the key theme in
international relations. It is another thing that below the surface
"ideology remains a key issue", "the desire to enslave smaller or weaker
states by larger or stronger states" remains the key issue and
"globalisation" is but another name of capitalism practiced at a global
scale.

The so called unipolar system also has limitations and is being
repeatedly challenged, if not conventionally, then unconventionally as
proved by events of 9/11. The famous philosopher Toffler may have
re-defined power but human nature remains the same as it was 2,500 years
ago. US Think Tanks and so called experts may advance subtle theses but
the underlying conflict is the same i.e. a West which adopted Eastern
Christianity and refashioned it as per Barbarian ideals versus an East
with a different mindset and a different set of values.

The international capitalist order was challenged by French Revolution
and the Communist Revolution in Russia but the power of the
imperialistic exploiters could not be broken. Nonetheless without USSR
military aid the Arabs could not have survived Israeli hegemonism. This
is an irrefutable historical reality.

Long ago the West's present dilemma was summed up by one of its greatest
historian Gibbon in the following words "Yet this apparent security
should not tempt us to forget that new enemies and unknown dangers may
possibly arise from some obscure people, scarcely visible in the map of
the world". In the same paragraph Gibbon cited the example of the Arabs
who had "languished in poverty and contempt" till the advent of Islam
when in Gibbon's words Islam" breathed into those same bodies the soul
of enthusiasm".

When modern US thinkers with links with US State decision making and
analytical bodies state with confidence that "ideology is no longer
fashionable" and that "international terrorism" is the key issue who are
they fooling. If this line of thinking is to be followed, whenever any
White Man or a Jewish man dies it is terrorism while whenever any non
White or Muslim dies this is casualty inflicted in sheer self defence in
the war against terrorism. A stooge is a man who was protected by USSR
and a King or Emir or a president protected by US Forces or US aid is a
perfect patriot.

Take the "Firebombing of Tokyo" on the fateful night of 9/10 March 1945.
On that night the US Airforce in the proud words of an American writer
"conducted the most destructive air raid in history". Sixteen square
miles of Tokyo were destroyed and some 83,793 Japanese civilian were
killed mostly by third degree burns while some 40,918 were injured. A US
General proudly exclaimed "It made a lot of sense to kill skilled
workers". Compare this with US position on 9/11. If for a moment we
accept that 9/11 was a great outrage in which some 3,000 were killed not
all of them skilled, what was Tokyo Raid of March 1945?

There is a subtle motivation here. An ulterior geopolitical agenda. The
West still fears ideology which it abandoned after 1945 in favour of
shameless materialism. It fears men who cannot be bought, who have no
fear for the tomorrow, who cannot be stopped by a NATO or the wide
Atlantic or wider Pacific. USSR may have been a more synthetic state but
the men motivated to die without motivated by the CIA pumped dollar via
Silent Soldiers is a more dangerous specie. Enters the Asian and African
Collaborator Regimes. Liberal Presidents, subtle Emirs, Egalitarian
Kings, all mustered like Sepoy Jahan Khan in the First World War to
fight the War against Terror. The Soviets were more naïve if less
morally defective than the American decision makers. The Americans seek
to accomplish enslavement through more sophisticated methods. Thus one
of their intellectuals states in an article that "unlike centuries past,
when war was the great arbiter, today the most interesting type of power
do not come out of the barrel of the gun".

Today this man says "there is a much bigger pay off in getting others to
want what you want". And there is no shortage of collaborators,
ambitious men who usurped power whether it was after the downfall of
Ottoman Empire with British or French money or in Egypt or Pakistan or
in Indonesia.

Somewhere deep inside the US decision makers are at a loss to admit as
to how with a 30 Billion USD intelligence budget, 13 Federal
Organisations dealing with Intelligence and some 30,000 eavesdroppers
employed by USA's National Security Agency was the Al Qaeda able to
strike. Compare 30 Billion USD per year spent since two decades with may
be 4 Billion USD lost in 9/11. If the East or the Islamic World has any
edge over the West it is in willingness to sacrifice rather than
materialism and selfishness.

What the West and particularly the USA fears is not nuclear weapons but
men motivated by ideology. Men who cannot be bought like the so many
Emirs, Kings and Military Presidents from Morocco till Pakistan.

The world has not changed from Gibbons' times. The New Barbarians as the
USA sees the Muslim radicals are more dangerous because they cannot be
bought. Because they have operational talent and strategic acumen.
Because they do not beg like Sadat for a Camp David but fight with their
limbs rather than Stingers. What the US seeks is destruction of ideology
which as per one theme presently floated in the so called prestigious
National Defence College at Islamabad is no longer fashionable.

This is the Clash of Civilisation and will continue till this world
exists or till the USA discovers a new planet where human beings can
survive and to which the Americans will migrate after all the mineral
resources of this world are exhausted and we are left to die without
water or fuel.

If this is so and if low intensity war is the only way in which the
conventionally weaker forces can defeat the conventionally stronger
forces then so be it. If extremism in thought or ideology is out of
fashion and out of favour with USA and its camp followers, so be it. If
we are in any case condemned to be sub humans in a world order dominated
by the G-7 and have no other recourse but to fight with bomb, dagger or
suicide explosive pack then so be it.

Jala kay Mashal-i-Jaan, Hum Junoon-Sifaat Chalay. Jo Ghar ko aag lagaay,
hamarey saath chalay.

WHY ISRAEL IS SCREWING MUSLIM STATES

Why Israel is screwing the hopeless Arabs and Muslims

Obama’s Afghan Strategy and Two Presidents of Af-Pak

IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT WE MAY AGREE WITH ANY OR ALL OF THE ASSERTIONS MADE IN THIS ARTICLE.


AGHA AMIN

000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Obama’s Afghan Strategy & Two Presidents of Af-Pak



By Usman Khalid



There were no surprises in the new strategy announced by President Obama over the now hyphenated countries Afghanistan and Pakistan referred to by Americans as Af-Pak. It is true that the cause of insurrection in both countries is the same i.e. Al-Qaeda. But there are differences, which if ignored, can lead to Viet Nam type disaster for America while the people of Af-Pak would bear much of the cost in human lives and misery. To understand that difference one has to start with a realisation that there is near unanimity in public perception in the Muslim World that America is their No 1 enemy, Al-Qaeda is No 2. What is their reasoning?



The Mujahideen defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in a decade long war in which the USA provided half the money (the other half being provided by Saudi Arabia) which averaged about 600 million Dollars a year. That is a paltry sum that almost every country can afford. Pakistan organised the forces and provided logistic support. The bulk of the fighters – Mujahideen – were Afghans but there were a significant number of Pakistanis and Arabs. Almost every Muslim country and community provided volunteers in varying numbers. It was, what the Americans call, Global Jihad.



After the Soviet Union was defeated, the Mujahideen looked for a reason why they could not liberate Palestine and Kashmir like they liberated Afghanistan? After all, Israel and India are not more powerful than the Soviet Union! They arrived at the following conclusions:



1. The unconditional and total support the USA gives to Israel is the reason why Israel was able to defy the world and defeat the Arabs.

2. The USA prevented the organised state power of Muslim countries to be used to liberate Palestine and Kashmir by imposing US protégés as rulers/leaders in every country.

3. Pakistan – a potentially powerful country with large and well-trained armed forces, near self-sufficiency in defence industry, which is a nuclear power – is unable to perform its proper role because its leaders are so eager to please America that they even co-operates with the enemy – India.



The response of the Arab peoples was to: 1) Organise non- state power like in Afghanistan; 2) strike at the USA. The result was 9/11. But Al-Qaeda had been a creation of the CIA. It was the name given by the CIA to its list of Arab Mujahideen in Afghanistan, who should have returned to their countries upon the exit of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. But this did not happen because of two reasons: 1) the ranks of the foreign Mujahideen had been infiltrated by ‘Takfiris’ from Egypt, who wanted to make Afghanistan a base for global Jihad; 2) most of the Arab governments were afraid of returning Mujahideen and closed their doors on them. The Americans CIA was not unfriendly to Osama bin Laden or Al-Qaeda. It saw a role for them as the Takfiris kill mostly Muslims. They slaughter Muslims accusing them of being ‘enemy collaborators’, they kill the Shia for just being Shia, and they declare those they fear as an infidels and kill them. Al-Qaeda had no difficulty getting public support against Muslim leaders who joined the US led ‘war on terror’; it was easy to demonise them as ‘enemy collaborators’.

The strong points that give Al-Qaeda credibility are: 1) being in the forefront of ‘resistance’ in Afghanistan; 2) their opposition to toady rulers in the Muslim World; 3) their ability to evolve new techniques and tactics to respond to challenges of asymmetry of power. But they have huge weakness, which include: 1) their sectarian outlook, 2) indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims in areas they control, 3) promoting a view of Islam that oppresses women, enforces regimentation and which gives law into the hands of those with guns, 4) weakening the state structures of Muslim countries already under great strain because of US pressure to ‘do more’ or to ‘do things differently’.



With the US having declared its intent to withdraw from Iraq, their weaknesses far outweigh their strong points. Al-Qaeda was beaten by the Sunnis in Iraq when they realised that its agenda was to engage in slaughter of the Shia. Al-Qaeda is being beaten in the Kurram Agency in FATA where they promoted slaughter of the Shia. The people in Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies have also taken up arms against the Al-Qaeda allies and beaten them. It would not be long before they are beaten in Waziristan also. The war against Al-Qaeda is already being won – not by the armed forces but by ‘peoples’ power.



President Obama has picked the right time and the right target i.e. to defeat Al-Qaeda now and in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda now sees Pakistan as its potential base and the worst excesses of Al-Qaeda are being perpetrated against the people of Pakistan. Since Pakistan is a country with a powerful and free press, the people have a weapon to win the war of perceptions. The people of Pakistan see themselves caught between Al-Qaeda and India. (I say India because India has operational control over US policy in Afghanistan). If the people fear and detest those engaged in wanton slaughter on their streets, they also detest their leaders eager to please India but begging for Dollars in exchange for allowing Americans to bomb their country. It appears that the USA has decided to get rid of President Hamid Karazai who kisses both cheeks of every Pakistani he encounters while allowing his intelligence to work with RAW (the Indian Intelligence) to destabilise Pakistan. It is not just Al-Qaeda but also RAW and the Afghan intelligence who are carrying out terrorists attacks in Pakistan. The attack on the Cricket Team of Sri Lanka was the work of RAW; the attack on Police Training Centre near Lahore was the work of Al-Qaeda. In both cases the ‘work’ had been carried out by their common sub-contractors who call themselves Pakistani Taliban.



The war against al-Qaeda would be lost by America because of being wrong not in broad thrust but in detail. The contact group idea is bad. It appears to have been founded on a fear that those not included would try to subvert and frustrate the US efforts. Since the L of C to Afghanistan is precarious not only in Pakistan but also through Iran, Russia and states of Central Asia, a widely based contact group appears to be a good idea. But why India? That is like showing a red rag to the bull. It is true that the present ruling parties (who represent a minority in Afghanistan) are hostile to Pakistan and friendly to India, but that is the problem. To perpetuate that is not the solution. All the neighbours of Afghanistan are Muslim countries. Even though erstwhile neighbours had been competing for influence in Afghanistan for over a century, that characterised an era when two of its neighbours – Russia and British India - were super powers. Now neither India nor Russia has a common border with Afghanistan. For the first time in its history, Afghanistan can have peace. It can transform itself from being a ‘buffer’ to being a ‘’bridge’ to Central Asia. That is the common interest of the countries of the region and the USA who would also like Central Asian states to be linked to the sea in the South.



The change of leadership in Afghanistan may not solve any problem. If the successor regime is also anti-Pakistan, the Americans might be able to declare victory somewhat earlier and leave, but Pakistan would be faced with hostile countries in its West (Afghanistan) as well as the East (India). President Zardari has welcomed the Obama speech because it promises him Dollars but the military is rightly nervous. They fear that the Americans are going to leave behind a situation even harder to deal with than in 1987. Even though the Government of Pakistan is not able to articulate or defend the interests of the country, the Americans are fully aware of what they are. Barbara Plett wrote in an article for the BBC News web site:



"The Pakistan army knows that it and the Taliban have Pashtun support on both sides of the Durand line. This gives it leverage, and means it can signal to the United States that it will not be abandoned in any Afghan deal.”



“Prior to his election, Mr Obama recognised that Pakistani peace with India was key to stability in Afghanistan. Since his inauguration, however, he has dropped any suggestion of an initiative on Kashmir in the face of Indian objections.”



“Now, he hopes a mixture of carrot and stick will force a rethink of Pakistan's security calculation.”



“But for Pakistan's security establishment, its concerns - the presence of India in Afghanistan, Kabul's refusal to recognise the border, the festering Kashmir dispute - are strategic threats far greater than those posed by Islamist militants.”



"The concept of pressuring Pakistan is flawed," Ahmed Rashid and Barnett Rubin have written in the Foreign Affairs magazine. "No state can be successfully pressured into acts it considers suicidal."



“Ultimately America's leverage is limited: in pushing too much, it may lose even the limited cooperation it has.”



The Americans want Pakistan to see Afghanistan and India as its friends at a time when both are aggressively engaged in clandestine operations inside Pakistan. If America does succeed in pressurising Pakistan to do what the populace sees as ‘treachery’ there would be a revolt in Pakistan. Is that what America wants? There are many in Pakistan who believe that to be the real US plan. But if the USA does really want peace in Afghanistan, as President Obama appears to say, it would keep India out of Afghanistan.



The Obama Administration has already decided to give aid to provinces rather than the central government of Afghanistan. That is a good idea; it would reduce corruption and give the USA better control over the actions of the local chieftains and warlords. It is well within the grasp of the USA to make good friends with the entire region – Af-Pak and Central Asia. It should avoid relying on military operation to destroy the resistance that it calls the Taliban. I have said before and I reiterate, when there is stand-off the one who is more generous emerges as victorious. The USA is in a position to be generous. It wants little; it has a lot to offer. It should focus on making friends not killing them. They should make use of the culture of ‘forgive and forget’ that a jirga represents. It is a mad to kill even more Afghans and declare victory over their graveyard. Time has come for a real jirga – a peace conference restricted to Afghanistan’s neighbours - to guarantee its borders and to ensure free movement of people and goods from and to Afghanistan. Afghans are even better as traders than as fighters; let their better self be given a chance.



The writer is Director of London Institute of South Asia



--
http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

THE REAL ENEMY OF ARABS AND ISLAM

NOT THE JEWS , NOT THE USA BUT THE HIGHLY CORRUPT , DUBIOUS ARAB SHEIKHS,KINGS,PRESIDENTS AND GENERALS.

THESE ARE THE REAL FIFTH COLUMNISTS WHO ARE ACTUALLY ON THE PAYROLL OF USA,BRITISH AND ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

THESE DUBIOUS ARAB SO CALLED LEADERS NEED TO BE ROCKETED FIRST.ONCE THIS IS DONE ISRAEL WILL LAST FOR MORE THAN A WEEK.

A REVOLUTION , A VIOLENT COUP DE TAT IS NEEDED.

Obama’s Team Prepares Escalated Bloodletting-Patrick Martin

Obama’s Team Prepares Escalated Bloodletting

Patrick Martin



(A day after he was sworn in as President, Barack Obama signed orders to close down Guantanamo and end the use of torture in the USA. The world was ecstatic that America may finally be embracing the ‘rule of law’. But the euphoria lasted only two days. On 24 January, President Obama opened his ‘murder account’ as the new Commander in Chief. He ordered Predator strikes in Waziristan that killed 22 Pakistanis in their homes. In Obama’s book, torture is intolerable but slaughter is another matter; it is the use of ‘smart power’. + Usman Khalid + )



By Patrick Martin , 24 January, 2009, WSWS.org



In a series of meetings and public appearances Wednesday and Thursday, and with the first military strikes of his administration, President Barack Obama has given a clear signal that he plans intensified bloodshed in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the US escalates its military intervention in Central and South Asia.



Missiles fired from unmanned Predator drones struck two targets inside Pakistan Friday morning, killing at least 18 people. As is always the case with such exercises in remote-controlled murder, US officials claimed they were targeting Al Qaeda, although even US media accounts admitted that the majority of those killed were local residents.



Three missiles struck the village of Zharki in North Waziristan, killing ten people, of whom five were described by US "security sources" as Al Qaeda militants. A few hours later, another missile hit a house in South Waziristan, killing eight people whose identities were not known.



The strikes were the latest in a series of more than two dozen such attacks since last August, and Pentagon officials said they had carried out the attacks under existing authority from the outgoing Bush administration, while keeping the new president fully informed of the action.



The death toll from the missile campaign, according to Pakistani government figures, numbers at least 263 people. Even US government officials claim only a handful of those killed had any ties to Al Qaeda or the Taliban.



The attacks on sovereign Pakistani territory are blatant violations of international law, which the regime in Islamabad protests verbally, while continuing to accept billions in US subsidies to the country's military.



Obama and his newly confirmed secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, staged what amounted to a political rally at the State Department Thursday, at which they announced the appointment of two new US pro-consuls to the region.

Former senator George Mitchell is to reprise his role from the Clinton administration as the US envoy to the Middle East. Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is special US representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The different titles reflect different roles. Mitchell has been given responsibility for reviving and supervising negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as between Israel and neighboring Arab states. His job is strictly diplomatic.



Holbrooke is to work with the US-backed regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the US military command in Kabul, to coordinate joint action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. He is not labelled an "envoy," according to the State Department, because he will have input into military policy as well as diplomacy, and because he will not be negotiating with the Taliban—a rebuff to pleas for such talks by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and some European countries.



Clinton called the two appointments "a loud and clear signal ... that our nation is once again capable of demonstrating global leadership." Obama said the two would "convey our seriousness of purpose" in both areas.



Mitchell chaired the negotiations in Northern Ireland that led to the 1998 Good Friday agreement, under which the IRA disarmed and Irish Republican politicians have joined the provincial government. He later chaired a commission on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict whose report, delivered in April 2001, was ignored by the incoming Bush administration because it called for a freeze on Israeli settlements on the West Bank.



Israeli officials, and particularly the right-wing Likud Party, which is favored to win the country's February 10 parliamentary elections, have openly expressed their distrust of Mitchell, who is partially of Lebanese-American ancestry (his mother was a Maronite Christian).



Mitchell's appointment cannot disguise the fundamental policy of US imperialism in the region, which makes use of the Zionist regime as its military spearhead against the Arab masses. Both Obama and Clinton, to whom Mitchell will report, have made clear their support for the 24-day Israeli onslaught on Gaza, in which more than 1,300 Palestinians lost their lives, and over 5,000 were wounded.



The selection of Holbrooke is even more ominous, since he has long served as one of the most ruthless representatives of American imperialism, going all the way back to his early days in the Foreign Service in Vietnam. He came to public notice as the leader of the US diplomatic team at the 1995 talks on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, held in Dayton, Ohio, that concluded with a US-imposed settlement in the civil war in Bosnia.



In his encouragement of ethnic cleansing by the Croatian regime of Franjo Tudjman, which drove a quarter million Serbs out of the Krajina region of southern Croatia in a 1995 offensive, Holbrooke could deservedly face war crimes charges. He later boasted, in his memoir of the Dayton talks: "Tudjman wanted clarification of the American position. He bluntly asked for my personal views. I indicated my general support for the offensive ... I told Tudjman the offensive had great value to the negotiations. It would be much easier to retain at the table what had been won on the battlefield than to get the Serbs to give up territory they had controlled for several years."



Holbrooke was fully aware at the time of the Dayton talks that the Croatian Army was carrying out atrocities against the Serbs, and was later quoted saying, "We ‘hired' these guys to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate. We need to try to ‘control' them. But this is no time to get squeamish about things." He will now seek to find new "junkyard dogs" to do the dirty work of American imperialism in south and central Asia.



In his remarks at the State Department rally, Obama reiterated his concern over what he called a "deteriorating situation" in both Afghanistan and Pakistan," a region that is "the central front" of the struggle against terrorism. This language, echoing George W. Bush's description of Iraq, underscores the new administration's commitment to military subjugation of the Afghan population and wider attacks on the Pakistani population of the border region, largely Pushtun-speaking and linked by tribal ties to the majority Pushtun population in Afghanistan.



Clinton said that Holbrooke's mandate would be to "coordinate across the entire government an effort to achieve United States' strategic goals in the region." These goals have little to do with the remnants of Al Qaeda hiding out in the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The real focus of the intervention, under Obama as much as under Bush, is to establish the United States as the principal power in the oil-rich region of Central Asia.



The renewed focus on military problems in Afghanistan was signalled as well by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who has been retained in his position during the transition from Bush to Obama. He told a press conference Thursday that US goals in Afghanistan had been "too broad and too far into the future. We need more concrete goals that can be achieved realistically within three to five years, in terms of re-establishing control in certain areas, providing security for the population, going after al-Qaeda, preventing the re-establishment of terrorism."



There is mounting anxiety in the Pentagon over the viability of US supply lines to Afghanistan, especially if the force on the ground is doubled, as Obama plans. Two-thirds of US supplies go through Pakistan and convoys through the Khyber Pass to Afghanistan have come under repeated attacks. General David Petraeus, the former Iraq commander who was promoted to head the US Central Command, with responsibility for war planning throughout the region, recently completed a trip through Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan, seeking agreements on expanding US supply shipments through those countries. He reported on his findings to the Obama White House on Wednesday.



According to a report in the New York Times January 22, another major concern of US military authorities in Afghanistan is the strengthening of Taliban influence in the southern provinces around Kandahar, patrolled now mainly by British, Canadian and Dutch troops, who are spread thinly through a vast area.



The Times reporter noted worriedly: "It is perhaps in Kandahar, one of the provincial capitals, where the lack of troops is most evident. About 3,000 Canadian soldiers are assigned to secure the city, home to about 500,000 people. In a recent visit, this reporter travelled the city for five days and did not see a single Canadian soldier on the streets. The lack of troops has allowed the Taliban to mount significant attacks inside the city."++