POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE
by Samuel Helfont
Samuel Helfont is the author of Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Islam and
Modernity. He is a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellow
in Princeton University's Department of Near Eastern
Studies, where he is pursuing a Ph.D. He is also an Iraq
war veteran and continues to serve as an intelligence
officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve.
POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE
by Samuel Helfont
Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood are two distinct forms
of Sunni Islamism. They have separate histories and separate
worldviews. In reality they are not even the same type of
movement. Their origins were largely unrelated. Their
historic missions have been completely different, as are
their current goals and means of achieving those goals.
Unfortunately, these differences too often are overshadowed
by a false Sunni-Shia dichotomy that tends to lump all Sunni
Islamists together. But learning the differences between
Sunni Islamists is critical to understanding politics and
terrorism in the Arab Middle East. One could even argue that
the most important division shaping Arab politics is not
between Sunnis and Shias but between the Wahhabis and the
Brotherhood. Before delving into current issues, however, it
is first necessary to define differences between Wahhabism
and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Wahhabism stems from the theological teachings of Muhammad
ibn abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century reformer. Abd al-
Wahhab was one of several "revivalist" thinkers to emerge
from that century. The mission of these revivalists was to
purify and thereby revitalize Islam. They carried the banner
of reform but unlike modern reformers, they wanted to
transform Islam on traditionally Islamic grounds. They did
not attempt to adapt it to other systems of thought,
politics, or culture. Their goals did not include
modernizing Islam to meet the demands of a changing world.
In this sense they were pre-modern. Wahhabism is thus, at
its heart, a pre-modern theological movement and Wahhabists
continue to make mostly theological arguments about the
oneness of God and proper forms of worship. Their historical
mission has been a call to reform Islam according to a
strict and narrowly defined theology. There are, of course,
political implications to this understanding of Islam, but
Wahhabism is still best understood as a theological reform
movement.
The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, is a political
organization originating in Egypt's cosmopolitan cities
during the twentieth century. The Brotherhood's Islamism is
one of several political ideologies to emerge out of Egypt
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Like
Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and socialism, which also emerged
in Egypt at that time, the Brotherhood's Islamism is at its
heart a political identity. The historical mission of the
Brotherhood has been political reform based on an Islamic
political identity. Just as nationalists promoted an ethno-
national identity, and socialists promoted a class-based
identity, the Brotherhood promoted a political identity
based on Islam. Unlike the Wahhabists, however, the
Brotherhood was not concerned with implementing a particular
theology. It recruited members who held various
understandings of Sunni Islam and its leaders were laymen,
not Islamic scholars. The Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-
Banna was a school teacher, as was the important brotherhood
theorist, Sayid Qutb. Al-Banna's successor Hassan al-Hudaybi
was a lawyer. Thus, the reforms that the Brotherhood has
called for have almost always been political, not
theological. In fact, they often mixed traditional Islam
with modern political thought. For example, the Brotherhood
has embraced nationalism, constitutionalism, and
participation in elections. Its rhetoric was-and continues
to be-full of anti-Imperialist arguments that are common
throughout the third world. These were not strictly Islamic
concepts.
It should be clear, then, that Wahhabism and the Muslim
Brotherhood are two distinct movements. Indeed the Muslim
Brothers and the Wahhabists have often been fierce critics
of one another. They each consider the other to have divided
the Islamic community. Wahhabists blame the Muslim
Brotherhood for what it calls hizbiyyah (partisanship).
They claim that because the Brotherhood supports the
formation of political parties, it has divided the Muslim
world into competing factions. Further, Wahhabists
criticize the Brotherhood's theological leniency, as well as
its modern political influences. As one Wahhabist recently
put it, the Muslim Brothers "have consistently overlooked
the principal aspect of calling their followers to tawhid
(the oneness of God) and forbidding them from polytheism,
because these are matters which require time and effort to
change, matters which people do not find easy to accept.
[The Muslim Brothers] were more concerned with amassing
groups of people together rather than calling the people to
the way of the Prophet."[1] The Brotherhood, on the other
hand, has accused the Wahhabists of being so strict in their
interpretations of Islam that they have caused fitnah
(schism). They argue that this fitnah pits one group of
Muslims against another and that Islam strictly forbids such
divisions.
REGIONAL POLITICS
Unfortunately, the differences and indeed the conflicts
between the Brotherhood and the Wahhabists have not received
the attention they deserve. In the aftermath of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003, a bloody conflict broke out
between Iraq's Sunnis and Shias. This conflict has led some
to see the entire region through the prism of the age-old
Sunni-Shia struggle. While this conflict is certainly
important, dividing the Middle East along sectarian lines is
not an accurate way to assess the loyalties-or predict the
actions of-various regional actors.
For example, when Israel went to war with Hezbollah in
Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and with Hamas in Gaza in the
winter of 2008-2009, the region did not divide along
sectarian lines. In both of these conflicts, the Shias from
Hezbollah and Iran aligned with Sunni Islamists from Hamas
and other Muslim Brotherhood associated organizations. On
the other side of the regional divide were Sunni Arab
Nationalists, traditional Sunni monarchies, and Sunni
Islamists with Wahhabist tendencies. These groupings are
generally indicative of the political order in the Middle
East. Indeed, on other contentious issues that are said to
divide Sunnis and Shias, the divisions that were apparent
during the recent Israeli wars with Hezbollah and Hamas
continue to be dominant. For example, the Sunni Muslim
Brotherhood has often defended Iran's nuclear program
ignoring the interests of its fellow Sunnis. So while a
divide does exist in regional politics, it is not between
Sunnis and Shias.
One reason for the Brotherhood's alliance with the Shias is
that the Brotherhood is a political movement concerned with
bringing Muslims together under an Islamic political
identity. It is open to differing interpretations of Islam,
and is, therefore, less critical of the Shias. Additionally,
Ruhollah Khomeini's political Islam in Iran was very similar
to the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. Both called for taqrib
(the bringing together of sects), both downplayed
traditional theology, and both have similar understandings
of an Islamic state. Iran, for example, has a constitution
and holds elections. The regime, therefore, claims
legitimacy based on a mix of Islamic and modern principles.
If the Muslim Brotherhood were to form an Islamic state, it
would probably look similar to the current Iranian state.
This is despite the fact that one group is Sunni and the
other is Shia. The Wahhabists, on the other hand, care more
about theology than politics. They, therefore, denounce
democracy as un-Islamic and often forbid Muslims from
participating in elections. They deplore what they consider
deviant sects such as Shiism, and even when their interests
align such as in Hezbollah's war against Israel, the
Wahhabists refuse to support Shias.
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabists compete for power
and influence in most Arab states. Because the Middle
Eastern political order is currently defined by Iran's push
for hegemony, the competition between the Brotherhood and
the Wahhabists has a profound affect on regional politics.
Any gain the Brotherhood makes in comparison to the
Wahhabists pushes the Arab states closer to Iran. Any gain
the Wahhabists make pushes the Arab states away from Iran.
This battle is currently taking place throughout the Arab
Middle East, yet because most researchers and analysts lump
all Sunni Islamists together, it has been mostly overlooked.
Policymakers, therefore, should understand that (1) the most
important division in the Middle East is not between Sunnis
and Shias, but the internal divisions within Sunni Islamism,
and (2) the success or failure of Sunni Islamism, as a
whole, is not as important to the regional balance of power
as who among the Sunni Islamists are successful.
JIHAD AND TERRORISM
The deep divisions between Sunni Islamists are not only
important to the regional balance of power. The United
States, for example, in trying to combat terrorism, must
understand the difference between Wahhabists and the Muslim
Brotherhood. Both streams of Sunni Islamism claim to carry
out jihad in the name of Islam, so researchers and analysts
often mistakenly lump them together. In reality, the Muslim
Brotherhood's jihad is not the same as that of the
Wahhabists. These two separate understandings of jihad may
share several important similarities, but they also have
significant differences and are sometimes even
contradictory. Understanding how each group comprehends
jihad is, therefore, paramount for policymakers concerned
with terrorism. Failing to distinguish between these two
groups could result in wasting valuable resources on
preparing for an attack that will never come, or worse,
being unprepared in the face of imminent danger.
In the modern world, the concept of jihad can been seen as
both useful and problematic for Muslims. It is useful in
offering a powerful and religiously sanctioned call to arms.
Many modern Muslims, from both secular and religious
movements, have called for jihad as a means of rallying
support for war. However, for modern Muslims engaged in the
battle of ideas, the legacy of jihad can be problematic. At
present, there is a widely accepted stigma against offensive
and expansionist warfare. This is particularly true in the
Muslim world which was conquered and ruled by expansionist
European empires in the nineteenth and twentieth century.
Therefore, many Muslims, attempting to fuse Islam and
modernity, have trouble coming to terms with the historical
practice of expansionist jihad. Consider, for example, the
sermons of the prominent Muslim Brotherhood related scholar
Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In one sermon, al-Qaradawi insists that
the "Prophet Muhammad did not carry a sword, but used the
good word to preach his message."[2] Nevertheless, in a
sermon less than a year earlier, he had claimed that the
Prophet Muhammad's life "was one of continuous jihad. The
ten years he spent in Medina were bloody jihad and fighting
against non-belief, infidelity, Judaism, and others."[3]
Because of this friction between pre-modern and modern
norms, the Muslim Brotherhood has reinterpreted the meaning
of jihad, infusing it with modern concepts. It generally
understands jihad as resistance to expansionist warfare and
imperialism. It does not consider domestic political
violence to be jihad and it condemns attacks on other
Muslims. The only time the Brotherhood considers jihad to be
legitimate is when it takes place on Muslim land that it
deems occupied by a non-Muslim force. Today, this would
include Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and
other similar locales. Once jihad is declared, however, the
Brotherhood uses whatever means it has at its disposal. This
includes suicide bombings, targeting civilians, and the use
of women and children.
Wahhabists, by comparison, care less about modern stigmas.
While they may employ modern norms in their rhetoric, they
refuse to have their actions constrained by modern
discourse. For this reason, the concept of jihad has
evolved differently within Wahhabism.
Wahhabists generally see the Brotherhood's reinterpretation
of jihad as an abomination. Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab's
interpretation of jihad makes no apology for aggression. In
fact offensive jihad was essential for the spread of
Wahhabism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The
famous union between abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud was
based on the idea that Saud would have much to gain from
religiously-sanctioned expansive warfare.
Modern Wahhabists attempt to stay true to the pre-modern
teachings of abd al-Wahhab. They do not consider modern
norms and stigmas to be of any significance. In fact, they
view the permeation of these norms into Islam as a grave
threat to the religion. Therefore, even completely non-
political and non-violent Wahhabist recognize that the
principle of offensive jihad is valid, although they do not
currently practice it. They are extremely critical of the
Muslim Brotherhood related scholars who have argued that
offensive jihad is invalid in the modern period. As one non-
violent Wahhabist argues, these Brotherhood scholars have
"belittled" the Islamic tradition "in the name of
'understanding of priorities'" and they have "declared their
loyalty for the Infidels in the name of 'creating a good
picture of Islam.'"[4] This particular Wahhabist considers
the more recent attempts to reinterpret jihad unsurprising
since historically, the "figureheads of the Bankrupt
Brotherhood" have been known to "distort, twist and water
down the objectives of Jihad."[5]
Another important aspect of Wahhabists' interpretations of
jihad is their very limited definition of who is a Muslim.
This is based on their strict theological interpretation of
Islam. Abd al-Wahhab had declared the overwhelming majority
of eighteenth century Muslims to be unbelievers and
authorized jihad to be waged against them. Abd al-Wahhab and
his followers were especially confrontational toward non-
Sunni Muslims including the Shias. This type of thinking was
reinforced in the modern period when it was combined with
Sayid Qutb's ideas. Qutb of course, was a Muslim Brother,
but his followers formed radical offshoots of the
Brotherhood that often combined with the Wahhabists and
ultimately turned against the Brotherhood's original
ideology. Unlike abd al-Wahhab, there is no evidence that
Qutb himself was anti-Shia. His theory of jahaliyyah,
however, opened the door for excommunicating Muslims who did
not conform to his understanding of Islam. When Qutbism and
Wahhabism were merged in the 1970s and 1980s, the result was
a small but extremely violent strain of Wahhabist Islamism
that produced groups such as al-Qaeda.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Understanding the divisions within Sunni Islamism will help
analysts both avoid simple mistakes and put events into
their proper contexts. For example, one should not expect
the Muslim Brotherhood to be anti-Hezbollah or anti-Iran and
vice versus. Conversely, one should also not expect
Wahhabists and the Muslim Brotherhood to work together
simply because they are both Sunni Islamists. When trying to
understand terrorist threats, analysts should realize that
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabists have different
ideas of what constitutes legitimate jihad. Analysts should
not expect the Brotherhood to carry out Al Qaida style
attacks on the U.S. homeland or against other Muslims. Yet,
Muslim Brotherhood critiques of this type of terrorism
should not be taken to indicate that the Brotherhood has
renounced violent jihad. To misunderstand this would be
extremely dangerous because in several cases, such as in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Muslim Brotherhood's understanding
of jihad represents a direct military threat to the United
States and our allies.
By viewing the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism as two
separate movements, U.S. policymakers can address each group
separately, forming distinct policies for each.
Wahhabism presents a unique challenge for U.S. policymakers
in that Wahhabists consider any epistemology not rooted
entirely in traditional Islamic sources to be invalid.
Therefore, it would be very difficult for the United States
to engage Wahhabists in direct public diplomacy or a battle
of ideas. After all, they do not accept the modern secular
premises-whether liberal, realists, Marxist, etc. - that
Western arguments rest upon. However, the United States does
have a direct interest in limiting the influence of the more
violent Wahhabists, and in empowering the most non-political
scholars.
The first step is for U.S. diplomats and policymakers
concerned with the Middle East to familiarize themselves
with the internal arguments and language of Wahhabist
debates. All Wahhabists, from the most violent to the most
passive, share the same basic beliefs. What separates Al
Qaeda from Wahhabists who oppose attacks on the United
States, such as the Saudi religious establishment, is that
some Wahhabists consider the United States to have entered
into a treaty or an alliance with an Islamic ruler. The
United States is, therefore, protected under Islamic law and
an illegitimate target for jihad. These are technicalities
of Islamic law but they are very important to Wahhabists and
can make the difference in convincing a Muslim to support or
refrain from supporting terrorism. Groups such as Al Qaeda
understand this and use it in their propaganda. For example,
when addressing its critics in the wake of 9/11, Al Qaeda
made sure to assert that "Truly, America is not, nor has it
ever been, a land of treaty or alliance."[6] U.S.
policymakers and practitioners should understand these
debates and in this example, make sure that the United
States is portrayed as having entered into a treaty with a
legitimate Islamic ruler. This can be done both by
pressuring Middle Eastern governments to depict their
relationship with the United States in this manner, and
through public diplomacy which does the same. Of course,
this type of public diplomacy will not, on its own, end the
threat of Al Qaeda and other violent Wahhabists, but it can
make it much easier for nonviolent Wahhabists to discourage
others from attacking American targets.
Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood, while not an
organization that U.S. policymakers should support in its
current form, is open to modernity and modernist arguments.
The Brotherhood has made clear that, at least in theory, it
accepts the validity of modern norms such as nonviolence,
non-aggression, human rights, democracy, and
constitutionalism. Policymakers concerned with public
diplomacy should, therefore, identify where they feel the
Brotherhood is not living up to these norms. For example,
when the Brotherhood claims to be nonviolent, it should be
challenged over its support for violence in Israel, Iraq,
Chechnya, and Kashmir. When the Brotherhood claims to accept
human rights, it should be shown where it falls short
concerning religious minorities and women's rights. When the
Brotherhood claims to be democratic, it should underscore
where its proposed policies fail to meet democratic
standards. Thus far, the United States has failed to
articulate these types of arguments well. It has, therefore,
let the Brotherhood's propaganda stand unchallenged; causing
many in the Islamic world to conclude that the United States
opposes the Brotherhood not because it is an undemocratic
and often militant organization, but because it is Islamic.
Policymakers should make clear that they intend to treat the
Muslim Brotherhood as they would any other political party,
regardless of religion. The more the debate focuses on the
Muslim Brotherhood's politics and the less it focuses on its
religion, the more successful U.S. policy will be. Through
engaging the Brotherhood indirectly in the battle of ideas,
the United States can challenge the Brotherhood to live up
to the principles that it already claims to accept.
By refusing to favor either the Brotherhood or the
Wahhabists,, U.S. policymakers might neutralize the most
radical elements of each movement. This impartial approach
might also avoid destabilizing the regional balance of
power. The United States could then form policies that pull
the Muslim Brotherhood away from militancy without pushing
it toward Wahhabism. Concurrently, it could attempt to limit
the extremes of Wahhabism without pushing this group toward
the Iranian-led anti-Western camp. The United States would,
therefore, be able to pursue its interests in long-term
liberalization/democratization while continuing to support
short-term stability.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Haneef James Oliver, "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun" The Wahhabi
Myth.
http://www.thewahhabimyth.com/ikhwan.htm
[2] "Near/Middle East: Round-Up of Friday Sermons 22 Sep
06," BBC Monitoring, September 26, 2006.
[3] Qatar TV, "Live Sermon from Umar Bin-al-Khattab Mosque
in Doha," (November 25, 2005), BBC Monitoring: Near/Middle
East: Round-Up of Friday Sermons 25 Nov 05, (November 29,
2005).
[4] "Readings in Qaradawism: Part 4, Discontinuation of
Jihaad." Salafi Publications,
http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=NDV16&articleID=NDV160
004&articlePages=1
[5] Ibid.
[6] "Translation of April 24, 2002 al-Qaeda document,"
Middle East Policy Council,
www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_alqaeda.asp
