Bahrain-Paradise of Blood suckers and their British partners

Bahraini Shaikh's give a new meaning to opulence:     http://www.businessinsider.com/bahrain-google-earth-2011-3#-31   يا شيخ، ويرحم البشرية

--

A.H Amin

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

--

A.H Amin

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

Martrydom is above religion-An ancient Concept

BUT HE HAD A BEAUTIFUL WIFE TOO
Connecting history while staying above narrow ideological or ethnic divisions and assessing todays events

Agha H Amin

Citizen of wilderness and stateless man

BUT HE HAD A BEAUTIFUL WIFE TOO
Connecting history while staying above narrow ideological or ethnic divisions and assessing todays events

Agha H Amin

Citizen of wilderness and stateless man

Comments on -US Drone Strikes in Pakistan-Bill Roggio

 Agha,

FYI.


David

The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in
Pakistanas well as reporting from The *Long War Journal*. Given the Taliban's
control *...*
www.*longwarjournal*.org/pakistan-strikes.php -

ANALYSIS OF BILL ROGGIOS DRONE ANALYSIS AND BEAUTIFUL CHARTS


My dear Friend


This is waste of time and ammo . It is not changing the likely outcome of afghan war. From a close angle I see the extremists adopt improved and subtler methods !


Long War Journal is a commercial site and they have to attract readers and thus the beautiful charts ?


What has the US dine to eradicate drugs in last ten years ?


Has these drone strikes made the Afghan roads in the areas south of line Kabul Shindand safer for Afghan civilians ?


The whole premise that the extremists should present themselves as sitting ducks to US drone strikes in an area some 20 miles x 50 miles is fallacious !


Suicide bombers and IEDs can train in any area other than the above narrow strip !


How correct is Roggios data ! The charts are beautiful and Roggios site attracts traffic ! But is that the strategic objective of US military in Afghanistan ? To make Roggios site commercially viable ?


How reliable is the Humint ? We have had the Muslim 786 Drone attack on the CIA Quixotes in Khost last December 2009 !


Lets be frank that the perception on the Pakistan side is that USA wants to destroy the Pakistani state and this is their real objective while Al Qaeda is only the stated objective ?


What has the US done to change this perception ? This is being reinforced every day ! As they said “fear made men believe in the worst “ ?


To say that Russia will support the USA fight a victorious war in Afghanistan is fallacious !


Support a country designing missile shields and attempting to encircle Russia in every manner ! Constantly holding dry runs of war against Russia !


If Afghanistan is trumpeted by USA as its victory over USSR , WOULD RUSSIA ALLOW A 100,000 US MUSKETEERS TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN VICTORIOUS ?


One fact is clear ! The US casualties are low which means that there is no real fight ! US companies in Afghanistan are making big bucks !


The defense contractors you have like RONCO,Dyncorps,Xe, SSSI ,Global ,MPRI etc are making good money selling HUMNIT to the US Government ! These companise are hiring Pashto interpreters , Balochi interpreters and what not !


Louis Burger , Fluor,Black and Veach ,Red Star , Mina Corps ,TRYCO ,Halliburton,KBR and Seven Seas may your Afghan success stories ! Certainly private business did well in Afghanistan ! But what about the soldiers real job i.e the war ?


What is the on ground situation ? From 2001 to 2007 I could travel all the 1050 kilometres from Kabul to Herat in my private vehicle without a single weapon to defend myself ! Since 2007 I cannot ! How easy it is to enter Kabul ! I have driven many times from Jalalabad to Kabul after 2200 hours !


How good is the military virtue of the Afghan Army ? A military machine that the US and its hirelings destroyed in between 1978 and 1992 has still not been created ?


The question is how good is Roggios data in real tangible terms ?


You have a US force in Afghanistan surrounded by all Afghanistans neigbours who want the US to fail for various reasons ?


You pound flies with hammers with your mighty drones ? And this is the cause for a martial celebration !


The americans need to read more about the greatest army in history the Wehrmacht or the Red Army which did the real fighting for the US ! War is not New York Stock exchange and the enemy is not Dillinger who the FBI or BATF can overwhelmingly outnumber and outgun !

Datta Khel is not Ruby Ridge where neo NAZIs from BATF , FBI etc can shoot a man of honours wife like a partridge !


No war in history was won by air power alone while the 100,000 overpaid , over fed musketeers have failed to pacify Afghanistan , failed to interdict the flow of 90 % of worlds heroin to Europe and the states !


Perhaps there is a method in this madeness !


How is that Ali Jalali the most outstanding Afghan professional had to be sacrificed by the US to please the drug mafia in Afghanistan ?


I am not a religious man and this is not about religion !


The bottom line is that US policy since many years is manipulated by the US businesses may it be Oil and Gas, Wall Street or construction ! The sacred business of war has been sub letted to commercial businesses !


There is a deep question mark about Drones and I will base my assessment that God may not be with both drones or the characters that they are targeting !

The other side has an independent will and all may not proceed as Field Marshal Petraeus may desire or as a Wall Street sponsored political supremo may decide !

You have a secretary of state more fit to be in the Wallmart , clueless about strategy or war and a naieve spinster (philosophically) who has never set a squadron in the field !

This is war and it has less or good luck and bad luck and more of logical consequences of our actions and our adversaries actions !








best regards


Agha










--
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN


Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear
of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!






--
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN


Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!

BOOKS ON MILITARY HISTORY

http://www.lulu.com/product/hardcover/the-1971-india-pakistan-war/11177056?productTrackingContext=search_results/search_shelf/center/1


Product Details
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Parachinar is Hell-Remembering Sadda

The Sad Tragedy Of Sadda Incident

Hamid Hussain

A Food supply convoy was attacked near sadda on Thursday 19th june 2008 this convoy also consisted of nineteen passengers. These nineteen passengers were kidnapped along with the thirteen trucks of food and medicine. After looting the convoy these thirteen trucks along with their four drivers were burnt to ashes.The rest of the eight drivers were taken prisoners and keeping them hostage for five days they were brutally murdered by first dismembering, disfiguring and then slaughtering them.

This brutal incident happened in the supervision of LT.COL Majeed and Atta-ur-rehman Assistant Political Agent (APA)Lower Kurram Agency Pakistan,infact the kidnapped persons were handed over to the terrorist by the security forces after the deliberation between LT.COL Majeed and Atta-ur-rehman (APA)with the local Taliban’s .The government kept the Turi Tribe in dark that the hostages will be released soon; This gruesome act happened when the security forces took over the control of hill tops of sangeena and balish khail villages, hence giving security coverage to the Taliban. This clearly indicates the what so ever happened, was with the connivance of security forces.

The kurram agency is besieged and remained cutoff for the last eight months from the rest of the country resulting in shortage of food ,medicine and closure of educational institutions in the area .The local population of kurram agency has appealed to the united nations (UN) to intervene and protested on this incident and closure of the roads.

POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE

POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE

by Samuel Helfont

 

Samuel Helfont is the author of Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Islam and
Modernity. He  is a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellow
in  Princeton   University's  Department   of  Near  Eastern
Studies, where  he is  pursuing a  Ph.D.  He is also an Iraq
war veteran  and  continues  to  serve  as  an  intelligence
officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve.

        POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE

                    by Samuel Helfont

Wahhabism and  the Muslim Brotherhood are two distinct forms
of Sunni Islamism. They have separate histories and separate
worldviews. In  reality they  are not  even the same type of
movement.  Their   origins  were  largely  unrelated.  Their
historic missions  have been  completely different,  as  are
their current  goals and  means of  achieving  those  goals.
Unfortunately, these  differences too often are overshadowed
by a false Sunni-Shia dichotomy that tends to lump all Sunni
Islamists together.  But learning  the  differences  between
Sunni Islamists  is critical  to understanding  politics and
terrorism in the Arab Middle East. One could even argue that
the most  important division  shaping Arab  politics is  not
between Sunnis  and Shias  but between  the Wahhabis and the
Brotherhood. Before delving into current issues, however, it
is first  necessary to  define differences between Wahhabism
and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Wahhabism stems  from the  theological teachings of Muhammad
ibn abd  al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century reformer. Abd al-
Wahhab was  one of  several "revivalist"  thinkers to emerge
from that  century. The  mission of these revivalists was to
purify and thereby revitalize Islam. They carried the banner
of reform  but  unlike  modern  reformers,  they  wanted  to
transform Islam  on traditionally  Islamic grounds. They did
not attempt  to  adapt  it  to  other  systems  of  thought,
politics,  or   culture.  Their   goals  did   not   include
modernizing Islam  to meet  the demands of a changing world.
In this  sense they  were pre-modern.  Wahhabism is thus, at
its heart,  a pre-modern theological movement and Wahhabists
continue to  make mostly  theological  arguments  about  the
oneness of God and proper forms of worship. Their historical
mission has  been a  call to  reform Islam  according  to  a
strict and  narrowly defined theology. There are, of course,
political implications  to this  understanding of Islam, but
Wahhabism is  still best  understood as a theological reform
movement.

The Muslim  Brotherhood, on  the other  hand, is a political
organization  originating  in  Egypt's  cosmopolitan  cities
during the  twentieth century. The Brotherhood's Islamism is
one of  several political  ideologies to emerge out of Egypt
in the  late nineteenth  and early  twentieth century.  Like
Pan-Arabism, nationalism,  and socialism, which also emerged
in Egypt  at that time, the Brotherhood's Islamism is at its
heart a  political identity.  The historical  mission of the
Brotherhood has  been political  reform based  on an Islamic
political identity.  Just as nationalists promoted an ethno-
national identity,  and socialists  promoted  a  class-based
identity, the  Brotherhood  promoted  a  political  identity
based  on   Islam.  Unlike   the  Wahhabists,  however,  the
Brotherhood was not concerned with implementing a particular
theology.   It    recruited   members   who   held   various
understandings of  Sunni Islam  and its leaders were laymen,
not Islamic  scholars. The Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-
Banna was a school teacher, as was the important brotherhood
theorist, Sayid Qutb. Al-Banna's successor Hassan al-Hudaybi
was a  lawyer. Thus,  the reforms  that the  Brotherhood has
called  for   have  almost   always  been   political,   not
theological. In  fact, they  often mixed  traditional  Islam
with modern  political thought. For example, the Brotherhood
has    embraced    nationalism,    constitutionalism,    and
participation in  elections. Its  rhetoric was-and continues
to be-full  of anti-Imperialist  arguments that  are  common
throughout the  third world. These were not strictly Islamic
concepts.

It should  be clear,  then, that  Wahhabism and  the  Muslim
Brotherhood are  two distinct  movements. Indeed  the Muslim
Brothers and  the Wahhabists  have often been fierce critics
of one another. They each consider the other to have divided
the  Islamic   community.     Wahhabists  blame  the  Muslim
Brotherhood for  what  it  calls  hizbiyyah  (partisanship).
They  claim   that  because  the  Brotherhood  supports  the
formation of  political parties,  it has  divided the Muslim
world  into   competing  factions.     Further,   Wahhabists
criticize the Brotherhood's theological leniency, as well as
its modern  political influences.  As one Wahhabist recently
put it,  the Muslim  Brothers "have  consistently overlooked
the principal  aspect of  calling their  followers to tawhid
(the oneness  of God)  and forbidding  them from polytheism,
because these  are matters  which require time and effort to
change, matters  which people  do not  find easy  to accept.
[The Muslim  Brothers] were  more  concerned  with  amassing
groups of  people together rather than calling the people to
the way  of the  Prophet."[1] The  Brotherhood, on the other
hand, has accused the Wahhabists of being so strict in their
interpretations  of  Islam  that  they  have  caused  fitnah
(schism). They  argue that  this fitnah  pits one  group  of
Muslims against another and that Islam strictly forbids such
divisions.

REGIONAL POLITICS
Unfortunately, the  differences  and  indeed  the  conflicts
between the Brotherhood and the Wahhabists have not received
the attention  they deserve.   In  the aftermath of the U.S.
invasion of  Iraq in  2003,  a  bloody  conflict  broke  out
between Iraq's  Sunnis and Shias. This conflict has led some
to see  the entire  region through  the prism of the age-old
Sunni-Shia  struggle.   While  this  conflict  is  certainly
important, dividing the Middle East along sectarian lines is
not an  accurate way  to assess the loyalties-or predict the
actions of-various regional actors.

For example,  when Israel  went to  war  with  Hezbollah  in
Lebanon in  the summer of 2006 and with Hamas in Gaza in the
winter  of  2008-2009,  the  region  did  not  divide  along
sectarian lines.  In both of these conflicts, the Shias from
Hezbollah and  Iran aligned  with Sunni Islamists from Hamas
and other  Muslim Brotherhood  associated organizations.  On
the other  side of  the  regional  divide  were  Sunni  Arab
Nationalists,  traditional   Sunni  monarchies,   and  Sunni
Islamists with  Wahhabist tendencies.  These  groupings  are
generally indicative  of the  political order  in the Middle
East. Indeed,  on other  contentious issues that are said to
divide Sunnis  and Shias,  the divisions  that were apparent
during the  recent Israeli  wars with  Hezbollah  and  Hamas
continue to  be dominant.  For  example,  the  Sunni  Muslim
Brotherhood  has   often  defended  Iran's  nuclear  program
ignoring the  interests of  its fellow  Sunnis. So  while  a
divide does  exist in  regional politics,  it is not between
Sunnis and Shias.

One reason  for the Brotherhood's alliance with the Shias is
that the  Brotherhood is a political movement concerned with
bringing  Muslims   together  under   an  Islamic  political
identity. It  is open to differing interpretations of Islam,
and is, therefore, less critical of the Shias. Additionally,
Ruhollah Khomeini's political Islam in Iran was very similar
to the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. Both called for taqrib
(the  bringing   together   of   sects),   both   downplayed
traditional theology,  and both  have similar understandings
of an  Islamic state.  Iran, for example, has a constitution
and  holds   elections.  The   regime,   therefore,   claims
legitimacy based  on a mix of Islamic and modern principles.
If the  Muslim Brotherhood were to form an Islamic state, it
would probably  look similar  to the  current Iranian state.
This is  despite the  fact that  one group  is Sunni and the
other is  Shia. The Wahhabists, on the other hand, care more
about theology  than  politics.  They,  therefore,  denounce
democracy  as  un-Islamic  and  often  forbid  Muslims  from
participating in  elections. They deplore what they consider
deviant sects  such as Shiism, and even when their interests
align  such  as  in  Hezbollah's  war  against  Israel,  the
Wahhabists refuse to support Shias.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabists compete for power
and influence  in  most  Arab  states.  Because  the  Middle
Eastern political  order is currently defined by Iran's push
for hegemony,  the competition  between the  Brotherhood and
the Wahhabists  has a  profound affect on regional politics.
Any  gain   the  Brotherhood  makes  in  comparison  to  the
Wahhabists pushes  the Arab  states closer to Iran. Any gain
the Wahhabists  make pushes  the Arab states away from Iran.
This battle  is currently  taking place  throughout the Arab
Middle East,  yet because most researchers and analysts lump
all Sunni Islamists together, it has been mostly overlooked.
Policymakers, therefore, should understand that (1) the most
important division  in the Middle East is not between Sunnis
and Shias, but the internal divisions within Sunni Islamism,
and (2)  the success  or failure  of Sunni  Islamism,  as  a
whole, is  not as important to the regional balance of power
as who among the Sunni Islamists are successful.

JIHAD AND TERRORISM
The deep  divisions between  Sunni Islamists  are  not  only
important to  the regional  balance  of  power.  The  United
States, for  example, in  trying to  combat terrorism,  must
understand the  difference between Wahhabists and the Muslim
Brotherhood. Both  streams of  Sunni Islamism claim to carry
out jihad  in the name of Islam, so researchers and analysts
often mistakenly  lump them together. In reality, the Muslim
Brotherhood's  jihad   is  not  the  same  as  that  of  the
Wahhabists. These  two separate  understandings of jihad may
share several  important similarities,  but they  also  have
significant   differences    and    are    sometimes    even
contradictory.  Understanding  how  each  group  comprehends
jihad is,  therefore, paramount  for policymakers  concerned
with terrorism.  Failing to  distinguish between  these  two
groups  could   result  in  wasting  valuable  resources  on
preparing for  an attack  that will  never come,  or  worse,
being unprepared in the face of imminent danger.

In the  modern world,  the concept of jihad can been seen as
both useful  and problematic  for Muslims.   It is useful in
offering a powerful and religiously sanctioned call to arms.
Many  modern   Muslims,  from  both  secular  and  religious
movements, have  called for  jihad as  a means  of  rallying
support for  war. However, for modern Muslims engaged in the
battle of ideas, the legacy of jihad can be problematic.  At
present, there is a widely accepted stigma against offensive
and expansionist  warfare. This  is particularly true in the
Muslim world  which was  conquered and ruled by expansionist
European empires  in the  nineteenth and  twentieth century.
Therefore,  many  Muslims,  attempting  to  fuse  Islam  and
modernity, have  trouble coming to terms with the historical
practice of  expansionist jihad.  Consider, for example, the
sermons of  the prominent Muslim Brotherhood related scholar
Yusuf al-Qaradawi.  In one  sermon, al-Qaradawi insists that
the "Prophet  Muhammad did  not carry  a sword, but used the
good word  to preach  his message."[2]  Nevertheless,  in  a
sermon less  than a  year earlier,  he had  claimed that the
Prophet Muhammad's  life "was  one of continuous jihad.  The
ten years  he spent in Medina were bloody jihad and fighting
against non-belief, infidelity, Judaism, and others."[3]

Because of  this  friction  between  pre-modern  and  modern
norms, the  Muslim Brotherhood has reinterpreted the meaning
of jihad,  infusing it  with modern  concepts. It  generally
understands jihad  as resistance to expansionist warfare and
imperialism.  It   does  not   consider  domestic  political
violence to  be jihad  and  it  condemns  attacks  on  other
Muslims. The only time the Brotherhood considers jihad to be
legitimate is  when it  takes place  on Muslim  land that it
deems occupied  by a  non-Muslim force.  Today,  this  would
include Israel,  Iraq, Afghanistan,  Chechnya,  Kashmir  and
other similar  locales. Once jihad is declared, however, the
Brotherhood uses whatever means it has at its disposal. This
includes suicide  bombings, targeting civilians, and the use
of women and children.

Wahhabists, by  comparison, care  less about modern stigmas.
While they  may employ  modern norms in their rhetoric, they
refuse  to   have  their   actions  constrained   by  modern
discourse.   For this  reason,  the  concept  of  jihad  has
evolved differently within Wahhabism.

Wahhabists generally  see the Brotherhood's reinterpretation
of jihad  as an  abomination. Muhammad  ibn abd  al-Wahhab's
interpretation of  jihad makes no apology for aggression. In
fact  offensive  jihad  was  essential  for  the  spread  of
Wahhabism in  the eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century.  The
famous union between abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud was
based on  the idea  that Saud  would have  much to gain from
religiously-sanctioned expansive warfare.

Modern Wahhabists  attempt to  stay true  to the  pre-modern
teachings of  abd al-Wahhab.  They do  not  consider  modern
norms and  stigmas to  be of any significance. In fact, they
view the  permeation of  these norms  into Islam  as a grave
threat to  the religion.  Therefore,  even  completely  non-
political  and  non-violent  Wahhabist  recognize  that  the
principle of  offensive jihad is valid, although they do not
currently practice  it. They  are extremely  critical of the
Muslim Brotherhood  related scholars  who have  argued  that
offensive jihad is invalid in the modern period. As one non-
violent Wahhabist  argues, these  Brotherhood scholars  have
"belittled"  the   Islamic  tradition   "in  the   name   of
'understanding of priorities'" and they have "declared their
loyalty for  the Infidels  in the  name of  'creating a good
picture of  Islam.'"[4] This  particular Wahhabist considers
the more  recent attempts  to reinterpret jihad unsurprising
since  historically,   the  "figureheads   of  the  Bankrupt
Brotherhood" have  been known  to "distort,  twist and water
down the objectives of Jihad."[5]

Another important  aspect of  Wahhabists' interpretations of
jihad is  their very  limited definition of who is a Muslim.
This is  based on their strict theological interpretation of
Islam. Abd  al-Wahhab had declared the overwhelming majority
of  eighteenth   century  Muslims   to  be  unbelievers  and
authorized jihad to be waged against them. Abd al-Wahhab and
his followers  were especially  confrontational toward  non-
Sunni Muslims including the Shias. This type of thinking was
reinforced in  the modern  period when  it was combined with
Sayid Qutb's  ideas. Qutb  of course,  was a Muslim Brother,
but  his   followers  formed   radical  offshoots   of   the
Brotherhood that  often combined  with  the  Wahhabists  and
ultimately  turned   against  the   Brotherhood's   original
ideology.   Unlike abd  al-Wahhab, there is no evidence that
Qutb  himself  was  anti-Shia.  His  theory  of  jahaliyyah,
however, opened the door for excommunicating Muslims who did
not conform  to his understanding of Islam. When Qutbism and
Wahhabism were merged in the 1970s and 1980s, the result was
a small  but extremely  violent strain of Wahhabist Islamism
that produced groups such as al-Qaeda.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Understanding the  divisions within Sunni Islamism will help
analysts both  avoid simple  mistakes and  put  events  into
their proper  contexts. For  example, one  should not expect
the Muslim Brotherhood to be anti-Hezbollah or anti-Iran and
vice  versus.   Conversely,  one   should  also  not  expect
Wahhabists and  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  to  work  together
simply because they are both Sunni Islamists. When trying to
understand terrorist  threats, analysts  should realize that
the Muslim  Brotherhood and  the Wahhabists  have  different
ideas of  what constitutes legitimate jihad. Analysts should
not expect  the Brotherhood  to carry  out  Al  Qaida  style
attacks on  the U.S. homeland or against other Muslims. Yet,
Muslim Brotherhood  critiques  of  this  type  of  terrorism
should not  be taken  to indicate  that the  Brotherhood has
renounced violent  jihad. To  misunderstand  this  would  be
extremely dangerous  because in  several cases,  such as  in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Muslim Brotherhood's understanding
of jihad  represents a  direct military threat to the United
States and our allies.

By viewing  the Muslim  Brotherhood  and  Wahhabism  as  two
separate movements, U.S. policymakers can address each group
separately, forming distinct policies for each.

Wahhabism presents  a unique challenge for U.S. policymakers
in that  Wahhabists consider  any  epistemology  not  rooted
entirely in  traditional  Islamic  sources  to  be  invalid.
Therefore, it  would be very difficult for the United States
to engage  Wahhabists in direct public diplomacy or a battle
of ideas.  After all,  they do not accept the modern secular
premises-whether liberal,  realists, Marxist,  etc.  -  that
Western arguments rest upon. However, the United States does
have a direct interest in limiting the influence of the more
violent Wahhabists, and in empowering the most non-political
scholars.

The first  step  is  for  U.S.  diplomats  and  policymakers
concerned with  the Middle  East to  familiarize  themselves
with  the  internal  arguments  and  language  of  Wahhabist
debates. All  Wahhabists, from  the most violent to the most
passive, share  the same  basic beliefs.  What separates  Al
Qaeda from  Wahhabists who  oppose  attacks  on  the  United
States, such  as the  Saudi religious establishment, is that
some Wahhabists  consider the  United States to have entered
into a  treaty or  an alliance  with an  Islamic ruler.  The
United States is, therefore, protected under Islamic law and
an illegitimate  target for  jihad. These are technicalities
of Islamic law but they are very important to Wahhabists and
can make the difference in convincing a Muslim to support or
refrain from  supporting terrorism.  Groups such as Al Qaeda
understand this and use it in their propaganda. For example,
when addressing  its critics  in the  wake of 9/11, Al Qaeda
made sure  to assert that "Truly, America is not, nor has it
ever  been,   a  land   of  treaty   or  alliance."[6]  U.S.
policymakers  and   practitioners  should  understand  these
debates and  in this  example, make  sure  that  the  United
States is  portrayed as  having entered into a treaty with a
legitimate  Islamic   ruler.  This   can  be  done  both  by
pressuring  Middle   Eastern  governments  to  depict  their
relationship with  the United  States in  this  manner,  and
through public  diplomacy which  does the  same. Of  course,
this type  of public diplomacy will not, on its own, end the
threat of  Al Qaeda and other violent Wahhabists, but it can
make it  much easier for nonviolent Wahhabists to discourage
others from attacking American targets.

Conversely,   the   Muslim   Brotherhood,   while   not   an
organization that  U.S. policymakers  should support  in its
current form,  is open to modernity and modernist arguments.
The Brotherhood  has made clear that, at least in theory, it
accepts the  validity of  modern norms  such as nonviolence,
non-aggression,     human     rights,     democracy,     and
constitutionalism.  Policymakers   concerned   with   public
diplomacy should,  therefore, identify  where they  feel the
Brotherhood is  not living  up to  these norms. For example,
when the  Brotherhood claims  to be nonviolent, it should be
challenged over  its support  for violence  in Israel, Iraq,
Chechnya, and Kashmir. When the Brotherhood claims to accept
human rights,  it should  be  shown  where  it  falls  short
concerning religious minorities and women's rights. When the
Brotherhood claims  to be  democratic, it  should underscore
where  its   proposed  policies   fail  to  meet  democratic
standards.  Thus  far,  the  United  States  has  failed  to
articulate these types of arguments well. It has, therefore,
let the Brotherhood's propaganda stand unchallenged; causing
many in the Islamic world to conclude that the United States
opposes the  Brotherhood not  because it  is an undemocratic
and often  militant organization, but because it is Islamic.
Policymakers should make clear that they intend to treat the
Muslim Brotherhood  as they would any other political party,
regardless of  religion. The  more the debate focuses on the
Muslim Brotherhood's politics and the less it focuses on its
religion, the  more successful  U.S. policy will be. Through
engaging the  Brotherhood indirectly in the battle of ideas,
the United  States can  challenge the Brotherhood to live up
to the principles that it already claims to accept.

By  refusing   to  favor   either  the  Brotherhood  or  the
Wahhabists,, U.S.   policymakers  might neutralize  the most
radical elements  of each  movement. This impartial approach
might also  avoid  destabilizing  the  regional  balance  of
power. The  United States could then form policies that pull
the Muslim  Brotherhood away  from militancy without pushing
it toward Wahhabism. Concurrently, it could attempt to limit
the extremes  of Wahhabism without pushing this group toward
the Iranian-led  anti-Western camp. The United States would,
therefore, be  able to  pursue its  interests  in  long-term
liberalization/democratization while  continuing to  support
short-term stability.

----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Haneef James Oliver, "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun" The Wahhabi
Myth.
http://www.thewahhabimyth.com/ikhwan.htm

[2] "Near/Middle  East: Round-Up  of Friday  Sermons 22  Sep
06," BBC Monitoring, September 26, 2006.

[3]   Qatar TV, "Live Sermon from Umar Bin-al-Khattab Mosque
in Doha,"  (November 25,  2005), BBC Monitoring: Near/Middle
East: Round-Up  of Friday  Sermons 25  Nov 05, (November 29,
2005).

[4] "Readings  in Qaradawism:  Part  4,  Discontinuation  of
Jihaad." Salafi Publications,
http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=NDV16&articleID=NDV160

004&articlePages=1

[5] Ibid.

[6] "Translation  of  April  24,  2002  al-Qaeda  document,"
Middle East Policy Council,
www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_alqaeda.asp